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Abstract:  
This article examines relationships between religion and racial intolerance across 47 countries 
by applying multi-level modeling to European survey data and is the first in-depth analysis of 
moderation of these relationships by European national contexts. The analysis distinguishes a 
believing, belonging, and practice-dimension of religiosity. The results yield little evidence of 
a link between denominational belonging, religious practice, and racial intolerance. The 
religiosity dimension that matters most for racial intolerance in Europe is believing: believers 
in a traditional God and believers in a Spirit/Life Force are decidedly less likely, and 
fundamentalists are more likely than non-believers to be racially intolerant. National contexts 
also matter greatly: individuals living in Europe’s most religious countries, countries with 
legacies of ethnic-religious conflict and countries with low GDP are significantly more likely 
to be racially intolerant than those living in wealthier, secular and politically stable countries. 
This is especially the case for the religiously devout. 
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Introduction 
Today’s modern societies are politically, religiously and ethnically diverse, thus a prevalence 
of intolerant attitudes poses a disturbance to the social harmony. Racial intolerance has been 
found to be a persistent problem in the United States (Goldman 2012; Johnson, Rowatt, and 
LaBouff 2010; Piston 2010; Valentino, Brader, and Jardina 2013) and in Europe (Billiet and 
De Witte 2008; Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin 2011; Ford 2008). Studies trying to understand 
racial intolerance and its covariates are thus of great interest to the scientific community and 
the public.  
Religion has been found to be positively related to racial intolerance (Allport 1966; 
Bagley 1970; Johnson, Rowatt, and LaBouff 2010; Hall, Matz, and Wood 2010) and anti-
immigrant attitudes (Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002), despite the fact that the 
commandment to “love thy neighbor as thyself” is an essential teaching of the three major 
monotheistic religions in Europe (Anonymous 2007; Vaticana 2011). Political conflicts 
involving religious and ethnic identities have long been a part of European national histories. 
The ethno-religious conflicts throughout the 1990s and early 2000’s in South-Eastern 
European countries like the former Yugoslavia, Georgia, and Turkey are examples. But racial 
intolerance is prevalent in Western Europe, too. A recent rise in racist and anti-Muslim 
attacks in United Kingdom (Elgot 2013; Taylor and Siddique 2013), France (Ismail 2010; 
MacGuill 2013), and Germany (Spiegel 2014) and racial slurs uttered by some European 
media personalities and far-right politicians  in the wake of the recent migrant boat tragedies 
in the Mediterranean have been widely reported in the media. 
The study of relationships between religion and racial intolerance has a long tradition 
in the United States (Allport 1966; Glock and Stark 1966; 1969; Herek 1987). In Europe, 
academic interest in intolerance toward ethnic and racial out-groups has risen only recently. 
There are a few case studies looking at anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim attitudes in selected 
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countries (Billiet and De Witte 2008; Ford 2008; Cutts, Ford, and Goodwin 2011; Frølund 
Thomsen 2012; Hodson, Sekulic, and Massey 1994) and a few large-scale cross-national 
comparisons (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Eisinga, Billiet, and Felling 1999; Doebler 
2013; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002; Schneider 2007; Strabac and Listhaug 2008). 
The vast majority focus on anti-immigrant attitudes, thus taking a Western European 
perspective. Yet, the Eastern half of Europe consists of sending, rather than receiving 
countries of immigrants. It is thus likely that intolerance toward ethnic out-groups in Eastern 
Europe manifests itself in relation to race and ethnicity, rather than immigration status. In 
Eastern Europe, attitudes toward immigrants are unlikely to be informed by past contacts. At 
the same time, countries like Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, Kosovo, Russia, and Turkey are 
ethnically diverse and have legacies of ethnic and religious conflict. Questions referring to 
race and ethnicity are therefore better suited than questions referring to immigrants to pick up 
intolerance toward ethnic out-groups in cross-national European comparisons.  
This article focuses on racial intolerance and its relationship with religion in Europe, 
paying particular attention to the import of national contexts of religiousness, economic 
wealth and inequality, and recent histories of political instability and violence. Racial 
intolerance is defined here as a disinclination to accept members of a different race in one’s 
close environment, for instance, as neighbors (Davies et al. 2011). Racial intolerance relates 
to the notion of prejudice, but while prejudice denotes generally negative attitudes toward an 
out-group (Augoustinos and Reynolds 2001), intolerance refers more directly to a rejection of 
its members.  
This article seeks to add to the existing knowledge in three ways: first, by examining 
how three dimensions of religiosity — believing, belonging, and practice — are related to 
racial intolerance in Europe. The analysis applies multi-level modeling to survey data from 
the fourth wave of the European Values Study (2010). The European Values Study (EVS) 
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covers attitudes in 47 countries and includes Russia, the Caucasus and the Balkan countries 
Albania, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, and Turkey.  
Second, the analyses test hypotheses about the role of national contexts of 
religiousness, wealth and inequality, and the countries’ average scores on an index of 
political stability and absence of violence over the years 1996 to 2008 (Kaufmann, Kraay, 
and Mastruzzi 2009) for the citizens’ likelihood of being racially intolerant. Third, cross-level 
interactions test hypotheses about the national context as a moderator of relationships 
between religion and racial intolerance. There is a lack of European comparisons of religion 
and racial intolerance, particularly a scarcity of studies examining the role of national 
contexts and their interplay with individual-level religiosity. The literature thus far has 
analyzed contextual variables merely in terms of their main effects without acknowledging 
their role as moderators of relationships between individual religiosity and intolerance. The 
key questions of the analysis are: how are the three dimensions of religion related to racial 
intolerance in Europe? Does the national context, the country’s mean level of religiosity, 
wealth (gross domestic product; GDP), income inequality, and political stability matter for 
individual attitudes toward people of a different race?  
 
Religion as a Three-Dimensional Phenomenon 
Religion is operationalized comprising of a believing, a belonging (denominational 
affiliation), and a practice dimension (church attendance, religious participation, prayer) 
(Davie 1990; Glendinning and Bruce 2006; Olson and Warber 2008). Previous studies 
(Doebler 2013; Huber 2007) found that the three dimensions of religiosity can be differently 
related to social attitudes.  
Religious practice is measured through church attendance. Church attendance is an 
indicator of involvement in a moral community (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Stark and 
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Bainbridge 1996). Moral community theory dates back to Émile Durkheim’s (1996 [1912]) 
notion of the church hosting a shared set of values. According to Stark and Bainbridge (1996) 
and Stark and Glock (1968), being integrated in church fosters pro-social attitudes, as 
churchgoers are more likely than others to internalize values of neighborly love and tolerance 
that are taught by Europe’s three major monotheistic religions (Anonymous 2007; Parenti 
1967; Vaticana 2011). Following the moral community argument (Putnam and Campbell 
2010; Stark and Bainbridge 1996; Traunmüller 2011), church attendance can promote 
tolerance even if unaccompanied by believing, because the morals of the religious spill over 
to their less religious peers (Putnam and Campbell 2010). However, the findings in the 
literature are inconclusive. A number of early (Glock and Stark 1969; Johnson 1977) and 
contemporary studies (Guiso et al. 2003; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002) find church 
attendance to be positively related to out-group intolerance. Strabac and Listhaug (2008, 280) 
find a positive relationship in Eastern but not in Western Europe. Others find negative 
relationships: Meulemann and Billiet (2011) report a negative effect on ethnic threat 
perceptions in a majority of European countries, Billiet (1995) and Billiet and de Witte 
(2008) observe that Belgians who do not go to church regularly are more likely than those 
who do to express racial intolerance, and Coenders and Scheepers (2003, 332–333) report 
that across Europe non-churchgoers are more intolerant toward minorities. One likely reason 
why the findings are inconclusive is that churchgoers are exposed to different messages 
conveyed by clerics in church. Whether a cleric preaches neighborliness or intolerance likely 
influences churchgoers’ attitudes. There are reports that religious leaders in regions such as 
the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo (Iveković 2002; Perica 2004), Greece (Mavrogordatos 2003), 
and Latvia (Mole 2011) have been preaching ethnic intolerance for years. With the surveys 
available on Europe, it is not possible to operationalize what messages the respondents have 
been exposed to in church. Teasing out such effects is beyond the scope of this article. We 
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thus cannot hypothesize an overall (positive or negative) relationship between racial 
intolerance and church attendance. The relationship likely depends on the context. 
The believing dimension is measured via different God-beliefs and fundamentalism. 
The literature thus far found different ways of religious believing and the content of different 
religious beliefs to be differently related to intolerance of out-groups (Djupe 2015). The study 
of relationships between believing and tolerance dates back to Allport and Ross’ (1967) work 
on (intrinsic vs. extrinsic) religious orientations and fundamentalism. 
Allport and Ross (1967) found that among both the extrinsically and the intrinsically 
oriented, orthodox and fundamentalist believers were more likely to be racially prejudiced 
than less orthodox believers. Allport and Ross’ work on religious orientations and prejudice 
has inspired numerous studies in psychology (Kirkpatrick 1993; Tiliopoulos et al. 2006).  
Studies in the tradition of modernization theory (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris 
and Inglehart 2004) found modern-individualized-, but not traditional religious beliefs to be 
associated with more tolerance. In addition, Froese and colleagues (Froese and Bader 2008; 
Froese, Bader, and Smith 2008) report that belief in a wrathful God, as opposed to a loving 
God, has negative effects on tolerance and trust. The idea behind this is that having 
internalized the notion of an unkind, punitive God is associated with exclusiveness and 
closed-mindedness and may thus foster out-group intolerance. The EVS distinguishes 
between belief in a personal God and belief in a Spirit/Life Force. The former accords with 
traditional (Christian and Islamic) religious doctrines, the latter departs from these doctrines 
and is more diffuse and open to alternative spiritual beliefs. Belief in a Spirit/Life Force is 
therefore more modern and individualized (Pollack and Pickel 2007). Both beliefs are 
hypothesized here to be negatively related to racial intolerance: 
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H1: Traditional belief in a personal God and modern individualized belief in a 
Spirit/Life Force are both negatively related to racial intolerance.  
 
It is important to distinguish non-fundamentalist from fundamentalist believing, as 
fundamentalism is a key predictor of intolerance toward religious, ethnic, and cultural out-
groups (Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992; Eisinga, Konig, and Scheepers 1995; Glock and 
Stark 1966; Laythe et al. 2002). Fundamentalism is defined here as an exclusive truth-claim 
of one religion over others, expressed by the statement “there is only one true religion.”1 This 
follows a convention in the literature (Kirkpatrick 1993; Leeming, Madden, and Stanton 
2010).  
Fundamentalism was found by studies in psychology to be closely related to closed-
mindedness and intolerance toward cultural and racial out-groups (Allport and Ross 1967; 
Altemeyer and Hunsberger 1992). It is thus plausible to hypothesize that: 
 
H2: Fundamentalism is positively related to racial intolerance. 
 
Regarding religious belonging, the analysis distinguishes between four religious 
traditions, Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and Islam. Denominational membership is, among 
other things, a marker of group-identification (Kunovich and Hodson 1999; Tajfel 1974). 
Social identity theorists argue that out-group rejection is an important aspect of in-group 
identification. According to the theory, in-group identification is achieved by distancing the 
self from out-groups, the “us” from the “them” (Tajfel and Turner 1979). Thus, people who 
strongly identify with a religion might endorse a stronger sense of social distance toward out-
groups and therefore be more intolerant toward them than non-members or people who 
identify only casually. However, since the scriptures of Europe’s three major religions 
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emphasize values of neighborly love and tolerance, it can just as plausibly be argued that 
members of religious denominations are no different from, or are even more tolerant than 
non-members. The literature so far is inconclusive. Some found Evangelical Protestants in the 
United States to be more intolerant than mainline Protestants, Catholics, and Jews (Beatty 
and Walter 1984; Burdette, Ellison, and Hill 2005; Froese, Bader, and Smith 2008), others 
found Muslims to be more intolerant toward deviant life styles (Inglehart and Norris 2003). 
These findings have not sufficiently been replicated in Europe. It can be hypothesized that: 
 
H3: Across Europe as a whole Catholics, Protestants, Orthodox, Muslims and 
those without a religious affiliation do not differ significantly in their 
likelihood of being racially intolerant.  
 
However, as with religious practice and believing, the relationship between religious 
belonging and racial intolerance is likely to vary between different national contexts. Thus, a 
main aim of this article is to tease out the import of the national context.  
 
The Import of the National Context  
The role of the national context for racial intolerance is under-researched. Several studies 
have analyzed relationships between countries’ levels of wealth, income inequality, 
religiosity and public attitudes toward democracy (Norris and Inglehart 2004; Inglehart and 
Welzel 2005), and social trust (Delhey and Dragolov 2013; Uslaner 2008), but there is a lack 
of studies focusing on out-group intolerance, racial intolerance in particular. Yet, some of the 
literature (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris and Inglehart 2004) suggests that religion might 
be more salient in poorer countries with legacies of political instability and violence. Its 
relationship with racial intolerance is thus likely to differ depending on the national context.  
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The literature on religious contexts is mostly based on the moral community 
hypothesis. Studies in this tradition assume that people living in highly religious contexts 
share religious morals (Stark and Bainbridge 1996; Traunmüller 2011). Social capital 
theorists stress that religious communities instill pro-social values such as good 
neighborliness in their members (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Traunmüller 2011). However, 
Putnam and Campbell also found members of religious communities to be less tolerant 
toward out-groups than people living in less religious communities. Furthermore, in Europe, 
the countries with the highest overall levels of religiosity are all located in the South- and 
South-East. The majority have histories of ethno-religious violence and ethnicity has 
traditionally been linked to religion in this region (Bieber and Daskalovski 2003; Waal 2004). 
It is thus plausible to expect that in Europe high levels of religiosity of countries are 
associated with higher levels of racial intolerance. 
It is important to add that the South-eastern European countries also have poverty and 
high inequality in common. Thus, higher levels of racial intolerance in these countries may 
well be due to factors other than religion. This will be tested below. Since the general 
argument here is that religiosity is beneficial to tolerance toward minorities, the author 
hypothesizes that: 
 
H4: When holding country-level wealth and legacies of political instability 
constant, a country’s average level of religiosity is negatively related to its 
citizens’ levels of racial intolerance. 
 
Modernization theory emphasizes the role of wealth and security in promoting value change 
from traditionalist, authoritarian values toward liberal values of self-expression and tolerance 
of diversity (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris and Inglehart 2004). In highly developed 
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countries with high levels of political stability, religion and traditionalism are on the decline, 
while liberal values and tolerance are rising. A similar argument is made by Wilkinson and 
Picket (2010) and Uslaner (2008) regarding the effect of income inequality. They claim that 
high income-inequality is related to a higher prevalence of mistrust and anti-social attitudes. 
It is thus expected that: 
 
H5: People living in wealthy countries with high per capita GDP, countries 
with high levels of political stability and countries with (relatively) low 
income inequality are less likely to be racially intolerant than people living in 
poorer, politically unstable countries, and countries with high inequality. 
 
Negative effects of country-level wealth (Adamczyk and Pitt 2009; Akker, Ploeg, and 
Scheepers 2013; Schneider 2007), political stability and good governance (Guiso, Sapienza, 
and Zingales 2003; Rothstein and Uslaner 2005) on out-group intolerance were confirmed by 
some authors. However, the relationships with religion have not sufficiently been examined 
yet. Contexts of wealth and political instability can affect people’s tolerance toward out-
groups not only directly, but also indirectly by moderating the effect of individual religiosity. 
Inglehart and Welzel (2005) suggest that religion has more influence on attitudes in 
poorer than in wealthier countries. The mechanism is that religion in poorer settings can cater 
to human needs for safety and security while at the same time leading to a more closed-
minded, rigid mindset. At the same time, identity theory (Quillian 1995; Tajfel 1974) 
suggests that (religious) identities may become more closely related to anti-out-group 
attitudes in contexts that create a perceived threat to the group. Low wealth, perceptions of 
instability, and high inequality are all factors that may enhance such threat perceptions. One 
may thus expect that:  
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H6: Individual religiosity is positively related to racial intolerance in poorer 
countries, countries with legacies of political instability and violence and 
countries with high levels of income inequality. In wealthy countries with high 
levels of political stability and in countries with moderate to low inequality, 
individual religiosity is unrelated to racial intolerance. 
 
The moderating effect of the national context on relationships between religiosity and racial 
intolerance, as hypothesized in H6, is tested via cross-level interactions.  
 
Data and Methods 
The analysis uses data from the fourth wave of the European Values Study (2010). The EVS 
comprises N = 67,786 individuals living in 47 European countries and is the survey with the 
most comprehensive coverage of Europe to date. The data are representative samples of the 
countries’ adult populations of 16 years and older and were collected in each country via 
multi-stage random probability sampling. The net sample size is 1,000–1,500 respondents per 
country. Because of Eastern Germany’s communist past and the resulting cultural differences 
between the two parts of Germany, Eastern and Western Germany are treated as separate 
entities.  
 
Variables  
Religious practice is measured by frequency of church attendance. Importance of religion 
(“how important is religion in your life?”) was included as a general measure of devoutness. 
It is important to include a measure of devoutness other than church attendance in order to 
capture those who are religious but do not go to church or mosque regularly. Across the 
pooled EVS data, 58% of respondents who do not go to church still consider themselves 
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religious. Meulemann and Billiet (2011) pointed out that Muslim women tend to attend 
mosque less often than men but are equally religious on other variables. The analysis should 
capture these respondents, too. 
Believing is operationalized via three types of belief in God: traditional belief in a 
personal God, belief in a Spirit/Life Force2  as a fuzzy God-belief (Voas 2009) that is often 
associated with modernization and individualization and fundamentalism. Fundamentalism is 
operationalized via the statement “there is only one true religion.”  
As measures of religious belonging four dummy variables for the respondent’s 
denomination — Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, and Muslim are included and having no 
affiliation is the reference category. The EVS does not contain enough Jews and members of 
other religious minorities to enable meaningful comparisons. Therefore, these denominations 
were summarized into a category “other denomination” and included in the models.  
 
Context Measures 
The following context-variables were included: As a measure of country-level religiosity, the 
mean importance of religion per country was aggregated from the EVS-data. The countries’ 
wealth was operationalized via their GDP per capita (International Monetary Fund 2007). 
GDP was log-transformed to adjust for its skewed distribution.  
 The countries’ recent history of political instability and violence was operationalized 
via the World Bank’s “Index of Political Stability and Absence of Violence” (Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi 2009). The models include the mean score over the years 1996 to 2008, 
capturing occurrences of political instability and violence over a 12-year period. Ethno-
religious conflicts and tensions are explicitly included in this index (Kaufmann, Kraay, and 
Mastruzzi 2009, 60, 67). 
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As a measure of income inequality, the countries’ Gini coefficients (International 
Monetary Fund 2007) were included. The coding and scaling of all variables is specified in 
Table 1.  
 
Controls 
The following controls were included: education (dummies: (1) respondent has tertiary (post-
secondary) education, (2)  respondent has above primary, below tertiary education), whether 
the respondent has experienced unemployment of three months or more, the respondent’s 
age, sex (male as the reference category) and self-description as right-wing on a left-right 
scale.  
Last, because there is a literature discussing the effect of the presence of immigrants 
in a country and contact opportunities on out-group attitudes (group-threat versus contact 
theory) (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Emerson, Kimbro, and Yancey 2002; Quillian 1995; 
Pettigrew 1998; Wagner et al. 2006), the models control for the countries’ net migration 
rates. The net migration rate was obtained from the Central Intelligence Agency World 
Factbook (Central Intelligence Agency 2008). This is done to test whether the other 
contextual variables in the models have significant effects on their own when holding the net 
migration rate constant. Table 1 lists the descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
multilevel model. 
 
Strategy 
The analysis compares relationships between religion and racial intolerance across Europe. 
Particular attention is paid to the import of national contexts. A multi-level analysis is 
therefore the appropriate approach (Hox 2010; Snijders and Bosker 1999). Because the 
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dependent variable is binary, multilevel logistic regressions are carried out using the software 
package STATA 13. 
 
Analyses 
The random intercepts model has the following equation: Log � pij
1−pij
� =  β0j cons + β1Catholic + β2Protestantij +  β3 Orthodoxij + β4 Muslimij + β5Church Attendanceij +  β6 Importance of Religion + β7Belief: Personal God + β8 Belief: Spirit or Life Force + β9 Fundamentalism +   β10Sex Female +  β11 Educationij + β12Unemploymentij +  β13 Ageij + β14 Strong Leaderij +
β15 Country Mean Importance of Religion j +  β16 GDP j + β17Political Stabilityj +  β18 bGini Coefficient + β19 Net Migration Rate+u0j  
In a second step, cross-level interactions between the individual-level religion variables and 
the context variables are introduced. 
When working with large-scale surveys, the analysis has to deal with missing values: 
of the 67,786 respondents in the dataset 5,689 have missing values on one or more of the 
variables of interest. Thus, a missing-data analysis testing whether missingness at random 
(MAR) can be assumed (Enders 2010, 13) was carried out. All models were then run in two 
sets, first as a complete case analysis and second applying multiple imputations using chained 
equations in STATA. The imputation model includes income, subjective health and life-
satisfaction as auxiliary variables. Thirty imputed datasets were created and the random 
intercepts models run across the imputed data. An imputation report is supplied in the online 
Appendix (Table A2). All models were tested for outliers and multi-collinearity diagnostics 
were carried out for all variables (supplied in the online Appendix, Table A3). The Cook’s 
(1) 
15 
 
distance-values of the following countries indicted that they are influential outliers: 
Azerbaijan, Kosovo, and Macedonia. In order to adjust the models for these three outliers, 
thus achieving unbiased results while still preserving the statistical power, the intercept was 
adjusted for these outliers and dummies included for each, following Van der Meer, 
Grotenhuis and Pelzer’s (2010) strategy.  
 
Results 
Table 2 gives the cross-country percentages of religious and non-religious respondents who 
expressed racial intolerance. The countries are ordered by percentage (countries with the 
lowest percentages appear at the top).  
Table 2 reveals two findings. First, racial intolerance is the least prevalent among both 
the religious and the non-religious in Western Europe and the most prevalent in South-eastern 
Europe, particularly in Albania, Azerbaijan, Northern Cyprus, Turkey, and Kosovo. The 
context variables hypothesized above are thus plausible candidates for explaining the 
variation, as the countries with the highest levels of racial intolerance are also among the least 
wealthy, have low scores of political stability, and above average levels of overall religiosity. 
It is clear that religious people are more similar to their fellow citizens than they are to fellow 
believers across countries, thus it is important to test for contextual effects. Second, the 
percentages suggest that there is indeed a positive relationship between individual religiosity 
and racial intolerance in a majority of countries. 
 
The Multilevel Models 
An empty model, containing only the constant and the random intercept3 yielded a between-
country variance in levels of racial intolerance of 0.792. Thus 19% of the total variability of 
racial intolerance in Europe is explained by unobserved country-level traits. Table 3 contains 
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the results of the binary logistic multi-level model, including individual-level religion, the 
contextual measures and controls. 
The model shows that of the individual-level religion measures it is the believing 
dimension that is really relevant for racial intolerance. As hypothesized in H1 and H2, both 
belief in a personal God and belief in a Spirit/Life Force are strongly and statistically 
significantly negatively and fundamentalism strongly positively related to racial intolerance. 
As to religious belonging, members of the four denominations do not differ significantly from 
non-members in their likelihood of being racially intolerant when controlling for the 
respondent’s education and socio-economic status. The findings thus support H3. 
Furthermore, across Europe as a whole, church attendance is not at all, and finding religion 
important only weakly and statistically positively related to racial intolerance. It is clearly the 
believing dimension that shows the strongest and most robust relationships with racial 
intolerance. Both traditional God-belief and modern individualized belief in a Spirit/Life 
Force are strongly negatively related to racial intolerance. Belief in the fundamentalist 
religious truth-claim, on the other hand, is strongly positively related to racial intolerance. 
When the model coefficients are expressed as odds-ratios, it becomes clear that controlling 
for the other variables in the model, believers in a personal God are 17% less likely and 
believers in a Spirit/Life Force 29% less likely than non-believers (the reference category) to 
be racially intolerant. Those who believe in the fundamentalist truth-claim are 35% more 
likely than those who do not to be racially intolerant.  
In summary, H1, H2, and H3 are supported by the results. Non-fundamentalist 
religious believing seems to indeed be informed by religious values of neighborliness and 
toleration that are included in the teachings of Europe’s major denominations. Fundamentalist 
believing, on the other hand seems to be informed by a mindset of religious intolerance 
(intolerance toward the idea that other religions might also claim some legitimacy). The result 
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of the model indicates that fundamentalist individuals are also vulnerable to racial 
intolerance. The controls sex, age, experiences of long-term unemployment and being right-
wing are all strongly significantly positively related to racial intolerance. However, the 
statistical effects of all individual-level religiosity measures vary significantly across 
countries, thus the next step is taking a closer look at the national contexts hypothesized to 
influence the relationships.  
Looking at the coefficients of the country-level variables in Table 4 we see that only 
two, the countries’ mean importance of religion and per capita GDP, are statistically 
significant. 
Income inequality, political stability, and the net migration rate all have significant 
effects when included on their own, but lose their statistical significance once country-level 
religiosity and per capita GDP are included. H5 is thus only partly supported by the data. 
The relationship between country-level religiosity and racial intolerance is positive. 
People living in countries with more religious populations are more likely to be racially 
intolerant than people living in secularized countries where religion does not provide a strong 
social context. Even when controlling for the fact that many of Europe’s highly religious 
countries also have a legacy of political instability and violence, the effect of country-level 
religiosity remains strong and statistically significant. Thus, at least in Europe, the good 
neighborliness, which is often theorized to be instilled by the moral community, does not 
extend to racial out-groups. H4 thus has to be rejected by the analysis.  
The finding makes clear that individual-level and macro-level religiosity should not 
be conflated. On the individual-level, religious devoutness (finding religion important and 
church attendance) hardly makes a statistical difference to racial intolerance, but as a context, 
at least in Europe, the moral community appears to have a dark side. Figure 1 visualizes the 
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relationship: countries with high mean-religiosity also tend to have populations with higher 
levels of racial intolerance.  
Turkey, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Georgia are among both the 
most religious and the least politically stable countries in Europe — and among the highest-
scoring in racial intolerance. Although the political climate in most of these countries has 
stabilized since the 1990s, high religious identification still seems to be strongly linked to 
legacies of ethnic — and religious tensions. Note that although the multi-collinearity tests 
(online Appendix, Table A3) were satisfactory, the model cannot avoid some degree of 
correlation of its country-level variables, given that the number of countries is limited. The 
Country mean importance of religion and “Political stability and absence of violence” are 
moderately correlated (Pearson’s r = -0.5), due to overlaps at the high ends of the two scales. 
As to country-level wealth, the relationship is as hypothesized: countries with high 
levels of wealth (GDP) also have more tolerant populations. Both findings are in line with 
modernization theory (Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Norris and Inglehart 2004): Populations of 
modernized, wealthier, and secularized countries are more tolerant toward racial out-groups 
than populations of less developed and more religious/traditionalist countries. H5 is thus 
partly supported by the results. When it comes to racial tolerance, the countries’ levels of 
modernization, wealth and secularism are more influential than the legacy of political 
stability, income inequality and migration rates. Note, however that when included on their 
own both political instability and income inequality are significantly related to higher levels 
of racial intolerance. 
As a last step, cross-level interactions were carried out between individual-level 
religiosity (belief in a personal God, belief in a Spirit/Life Force, fundamentalism, 
importance of religion and church attendance)4 and the country-level variables. Each cross-
level interaction was included in a separate step of the model. 
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The aim is to test whether the relationships between religion and racial intolerance are 
moderated by the country-level traits hypothesized in H65. Table 4 shows the cross-level 
interactions. The models were run including all controls.  
Table 4 shows a consistent pattern of moderation of individual religiosity by country-
level variables. Finding religion important and attending church regularly are more strongly 
related to racial intolerance in countries that are highly religious, have legacies of political 
instability and violence, low GDP, and low net migration rates. The latter finding is likely 
related to fewer contact opportunities with racial out-groups, as theorized by contact theory 
(Emerson, Kimbro, and Yancey 2002; Pettigrew 1998; Quillian 1995). 
Figure 2 visualizes these micro-macro relationships at the example of finding religion 
important. The figure combines four cross-level interaction plots between importance of 
religion and the countries’ aggregate-levels of religiosity, mean “political stability and 
absence of violence 1996–2008”-scores, GDP per capita, and the countries’ net migration 
rates.  
The plots show the average marginal effect of importance of religion along the scales 
of the four country-level variables with 95% confidence intervals. The y-axes display the 
change in the likelihood of expressing racial intolerance for a one-unit change in importance 
of religion at each point on the scales of the country-level variables. We see clearly from 
Figure 2 that the likelihood of religiously devout people of expressing racial intolerance 
increases with increasing levels of aggregate country-religiosity, political instability, and 
poverty (low GDP). In countries with low levels of religiosity, high levels of wealth, political 
stability, and high net migration rates the coefficient of importance of religion is even 
negative, although the effect is only modest and the confidence intervals indicate that the true 
value might be close to zero in these countries. 
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These patterns lend further support to modernization theory (Inglehart and Welzel 
2005; Norris and Inglehart 2004). The countries’ levels of income inequality, as theorized by 
Wilkinson and Picket (2010), do not significantly moderate any of the religiosity effects. H6 
is thus partly supported by the results.  
Interestingly, the interactions between the country-level predictors and religious 
believing are consistently weaker than the interactions with church attendance and 
importance of religion. The countries’ aggregate-levels of religiosity and their levels of 
income inequality and migration do not moderate the statistical effects of religious believing 
at all. Country GDP shows a moderating effect only on belief in a Spirit/Life Force and on 
fundamentalism, but not on belief in a Personal God and the mean political stability 1996–
2008-score moderates only fundamentalism. The direction of the relationships is consistent 
with the other religion measures.  
The negative effects of non-fundamentalist God-beliefs are strong across Europe as a 
whole and highly robust across the majority of countries.  
In summary, of the three dimensions of religion, it is the believing dimension that 
matters most for racial tolerance across countries. Non-fundamentalist individual believing is 
strongly negatively related to racial intolerance in Europe. The relationship is reversed in a 
small group of South-Eastern European countries that have low levels of economic 
development paired with high levels of aggregate religiosity, political instability and legacies 
of ethno-religious violence. 
 
Discussion and Conclusion 
The analyses presented in this article tried to examine how three dimensions of religiosity, 
believing, belonging and practice are related to racial intolerance in Europe and how 
religious, economic and political national contexts influence the relationship. The results of 
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the multi-level models confirm some of the literature (Inlehart and Welzel 2005; Norris and 
Inglehart 2004; Scheepers, Gijsberts, and Hello 2002), but also add new insights to the body 
of knowledge on religion and racial intolerance. The main findings are that of the three 
dimensions of religion, believing exhibits the strongest relationships with racial intolerance, 
differences across religious traditions are largely accounted for by other variables and 
religious practice (church attendance) is statistically unrelated to racial intolerance in most 
European countries. The findings indicate that across Europe the private contemplation of 
religious beliefs and values is more influential for racial tolerance. Non-fundamentalist 
believing is strongly negatively related to racial intolerance, and the relationship is highly 
robust across countries. 
The national context matters greatly for the likelihood of individuals tolerating racial 
out-groups: the countries’ wealth (low GDP), aggregate levels of religiosity, and legacies of 
political instability and violence are strongly related to the populations’ levels of racial 
intolerance and moderate the effect of individual religiosity. Devoutness and religious 
practice are positively related to racial intolerance in (relatively) poor and politically 
unstable, but not in wealthy European countries that have a long tradition of democratic 
stability. The pure effect of aggregate religiosity on racial intolerance is difficult to ascertain 
because in Europe there is an overlap between high levels of country-religiosity, high levels 
of political instability, and historical legacies of ethnic and/or religious violence. The main 
cluster that stands out consists of South-eastern European countries: Armenia, Albania, 
Azerbaijan, Kosovo, Macedonia, Georgia, and Turkey. The analysis found strong 
associations between these contexts and racial intolerance, but causal assumptions cannot 
easily be made based on cross-sectional data. Future longitudinal analyses of relationships 
between religion and out-group intolerance in these countries would add greatly to the 
existing knowledge. 
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The finding merits a renewed discussion of the moral community hypothesis: the 
literature so far (Putnam and Campbell 2010; Stark and Bainbridge 1996; Traunmüller 2011) 
has been somewhat optimistic about the civic benefits of religious contexts. However, moral 
community theory tends to underestimate the dark side of the moral community: The results 
of this article demonstrate that indicators of strong moral communities that have been found 
to foster good neighborliness (Putnam and Campbell 2010) and prevent crime in the United 
States (Stark and Bainbridge 1996) are positively related to racial intolerance in several 
South-Eastern European countries. High overall levels of religiosity combined with historical 
legacies of ethnic conflict (Anzulovic 1999; Waal 2004) and economic deprivation can create 
dysfunctional moral communities that foster the spread of anti-social attitudes not only 
among the religious, but also among non-religious citizens. The link between dysfunctional 
moral communities, religion, and intolerance in Eastern and South-Eastern Europe has not 
sufficiently been examined yet. This is a gap in the literature. In particular, what are possible 
mechanisms that create persistent links between religion and intolerance in some countries 
but not in others? Future work could contribute greatly to the existing knowledge by 
providing further in-depth analyses of the relationship in this region. The results of this paper 
found important relationships between racial intolerance and religion across Europe and 
highlighted national contexts that are influential for these relationships. They are thus a first 
step in this direction. 
 
Notes 
 
1. The statement “there is only one true religion” is dummy-coded against the reference 
“other religions have some basic truths as well” and “all great world religions have some 
truths to offer.”  
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2. The RMSEA value of the multi-group (item-response-) confirmatory factor analysis 
(Embretson and Reise 2000) of the five-item scale was 0.09 when all five ethnic-religious 
groups of the battery were included. Excluding items with low factor loadings did not yield a 
better model fit, the RMSEA remained over 0.07. The literature names a value of 0.05 or 
lowers as a requirement for acceptable model fit (see Brown 2006, 84). The result suggests 
that not all five items can be assumed to have the same meaning across countries. Partial 
scalar invariance, a necessary condition to be allowed to compare the results across countries 
(Meulemann and Billiet 2011) was not achieved. Especially intolerance of immigrants, the 
measure chosen most often in the European literature does not discriminate as well as not 
wanting a person of a different race as a neighbor in sending countries of immigrants like 
Turkey, Azerbaijan, Lithuania, Albania, Moldova, and Ukraine. Tables containing the factor 
loadings and intercepts can be obtained from the author upon request. 
3. Both types of belief in God are categories of “Which of these statements comes 
closest to your beliefs? — there is a personal God — there is some sort of Spirit or Life Force 
— I don’t know what to think — I don’t really think there is any sort of God, Spirit or 
Life/Force.” The two answers “I don’t know what to think” and “I don’t really believe there 
is any sort of God, Spirit or Life Force” were collapsed to form the reference category 
because there were not enough cases in all countries to include the atheist category in the 
model.  
4. The Intercepts of the models are allowed to vary randomly across countries. For 
reasons of space economy the empty model is not presented in Table 3. 
5. Since membership in religious denominations is highly clustered by country, it is not 
feasible to analyze moderation of denominational belonging by the national context using 
cross-level interactions. It is known that Orthodox and Muslim denominational membership 
is clustered in Eastern- and South-Eastern European countries.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics for outcome variables 
 
Continuous 
Variable 
Obs. Mean    Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Church 
Attendance 
66960 3.41         1.92 1 7 
Importance of 
Religion  
66793 2.68 1.04 1 4 
Age 67495 46.35           17.79 14 108 
Country-Mean 
Importance of 
Religion 
66786 2.68 0.52 1.53 3.75 
GDP per capita in 
Mjo USD, log 
67286 9.73 1.05 7.43 11.67 
Political Stability 
and Absence of 
violence, Mean 
1996-2008, 
67286  0.39 0.723 -1.03 1.48 
Gini Coefficient 67786 32.18 4.62 24.70 43.20 
Net Migration 
Rate 
67286 0.56 2.58 -4.95 8.54 
Categorical 
Variables Obs. Percent  Min. Max. 
“Would not like 
as Neighbors: 
People of a 
different Race” 
64997 16.0  0 1 
Catholic 67286 27.0           0 1 
Protestant 67286 11.0             0 1 
Orthodox 67286 23.0              0 1 
Muslim 67286 11.0            0 1 
Other 
Denomination 
67286 1.0            0 1 
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Belief: Personal 
God 
66909 43.0  0 1 
Belief: Spirit/Life 
Force 
66909 32.0  0 1 
Belief: 
Fundamentalism 
66603 26.0  0 1 
Tertiary 
Education 
67171 23.0             0 1 
Sex: Female 67274 55.0             0 1 
Long-Term 
Unemployment  
67286 25.0             0 1 
Right-wing 62533 15.0  0 1 
Note: Political Stability = high values indicate high stability, Gini Coefficient = high values 
indicate high inequality. 
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Table 2. Percent racially intolerant among the religious and non-religious across 
countries 
“Would not like as Neighbors: People of a different Race” 
 
attends 
church at 
least 
once a 
month 
attends 
church 
less than 
once a 
month 
Religion 
is 
important 
Religion 
is not 
important 
Sweden 0.0 6.3 6.4 5.3 
Iceland 1.6 1.1 1.0 1.3 
Belgium 3.2 6.2 4.8 5.8 
Denmark 3.9 4.1 5.2 3.7 
France 4.2 3.3 4.9 2.6 
Switzerland 4.5 2.5 3.0 2.9 
Great Britain 4.8 5.7 4.6 6.7 
Spain 5.2 3.6 5.2 3.2 
Northern Ireland 6.2 9.1 7.7 7.6 
Germany East 6.5 4.4 2.8 4.6 
Germany West 6.5 3.3 4.4 3.9 
Norway 7.7 5.7 5.5 4.8 
Finland 8.6 8.7 7.8 9.1 
Netherlands 10 9.7 11.9 10.2 
Portugal 10.1 10.3 12.5 11.3 
Hungary 11.8 8.7 8.9 9.0 
Poland 12.3 12.1 11.5 13.6 
Croatia 12.4 12.7 12.5 12.4 
Ireland 12.5 9.8 11.3 8.7 
Greece 13.1 7.5 10.8 6.1 
Montenegro 13.3 12.5 13.6 9.5 
Luxembourg 13.4 12.2 14.4 10.9 
Bosnia 
Herzegovina 14.6 13.6 12.7 19.6 
Ukraine 14.8 7.7 8.6 11.5 
Slovak Republic 15.3 12.9 15.7 13.0 
Italy 15.6 16.0 15.4 15.3 
Latvia 15.7 13.5 15.0 13.0 
Russian 
Federation 15.9 15.5 14.4 16.5 
Austria 16.9 17.7 14.4 19.6 
Belarus 17.5 18.0 17.9 17.3 
Cyprus 17.9 15.3 16.3 18.8 
Bulgaria 18.4 19.9 20.8 19.7 
Lithuania 18.5 12.8 18.8 11.1 
Serbia 19.7 20.0 20.0 17.4 
Romania 20.4 19.9 19.9 20.5 
Czech Republic 21.1 21.8 25.1 21.2 
Moldova 21.5 17.6 18.9 19.6 
Georgia 22.9 22.0 22.5 17.9 
Estonia 23.7 23.0 24.9 23.5 
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Macedonia 24.1 19.5 20.2 24.6 
Malta 25.2 22.6 24.7 26.4 
Slovenia 27.3 28.6 28.1 28.5 
Albania 31.9 36.4 41.3 28.8 
Kosovo 34.1 22.1 29.1 20.4 
Azerbaijan 36.3 26.3 30.9 21.0 
Turkey 45.1 40.6 42.6 30.8 
Armenia 45.2 39.9 42.9 34.6 
Northern Cyprus 54.0 59.0 54.7 56.7 
Total 19.1 15.2 18.9 12.9 
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Table 3. Binary logistic multilevel models — Religion and racial intolerance 
DV: “Would not like as Neighbor: People of a different 
Race” 
 Coef. S.E. 
Belief: Personal God -0.178*** 0.035 
Belief: Spirit/Life Force -0.329*** 0.035 
Fundamentalism 0.300*** 0.028 
Catholic 0.036 0.045 
Protestant 0.030 0.065 
Orthodox 0.085 0.045 
Muslim 0.119 0.067 
Other Denomination -0.043 0.097 
Church Attendance 0.007 0.008 
Importance of Religion  0.031* 0.015 
Education: Tertiary -0.452*** 0.037 
Education: Below tertiary, 
above primary 
-0.192*** 0.030 
Sex: Female -0.086*** 0.022 
Long-term Unemployment 0.083** 0.026 
Age 0.003*** 0.000 
Right-wing 0.249*** 0.030 
Country-Mean Importance of 
Religion 
0.415* 0.217 
GDP (log) -0.416* 0.180 
Political Stability Index 0.438 0.288 
Gini Coefficient 0.011 0.002 
Net Migration rate -0.063 0.048 
Dummy: Azerbaijan, Kosovo, 
Macedonia 
0.725 1.958 
Constant -0.388* 0.179 
Random part:   
Level-2-Variance 0.398 0.004 
Wald-test (overall model) 31.80***  
N 67,786  
 
*P < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Note: The Estimates are from the multiply imputed 
model, based on 30 imputations.  
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Table 4. Racial intolerance and the national context — Cross-level interactions 
DV: “Would not like as Neighbor: People of a 
different Race” 
   Coef. S.E. Wald-
test 
Country Mean Importance of  Religion *Belief: 
Personal God 
0.033 0.029 0.00 
Country Mean Importance of  Religion *Belief: 
Spirit/Life Force 
-0.001 0.039 0.78 
Country Mean Importance of  Religion 
*Fundamentalism 
 0.018 0.028 0.39 
Country Mean Importance of  
Religion*Importance of Religion 
 0.033* 0.034 5.44* 
Country Mean Importance of  Religion*Church 
Attendance 
0.005* 0.001 8.5* 
GDP*Belief: Personal God -0.002 0.055 1.36 
GDP*Belief: Spirit/Life Force  -0.053* 0.023 13.6** 
GDP*Fundamentalism -0.068* 0.030 4.8* 
GDP*Importance of Religion -0.066*** 0.014 6.7* 
GDP*Church Attendance -0.029** 0.009 7.9* 
Political Stability 1996-2008, Mean *Belief: 
Personal God 
-0.090* 0.040 5.64* 
Political Stability 1996-2008, Mean *Belief: 
Spirit/Life Force 
-0.014 0.040 0.14 
Political Stability 1996-2008, Mean 
*Fundamentalism 
-0.003 0.021 1.79 
Political Stability 1996-2008, Mean *Importance 
of Religion  
-0.076*** 0.019 15.74** 
Political Stability 1996-2008, Mean *Church 
Attendance 
-0.028** 0.008 10.57** 
Gini Coefficient *Belief: Personal God 0.044 0.029 2.39 
Gini Coefficient *Belief: Spirit/Life Force -0.001 0.028 0.14 
Gini Coefficient *Fundamentalism   -0.007 0.028 0.10 
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Gini Coefficient *Importance of Religion 0.025 0.014 1.13 
Gini Coefficient *Church Attendance 0.009 0.007 1.55 
Net Migration Rate* Belief: Personal God   -0.007 0.009 0.64 
Net Migration Rate* Belief: Spirit/Life Force   -0.002 0.010 3.90 
Net Migration Rate* Fundamentalism -0.059 0.049 4.60 
Net Migration Rate* Importance of Religion -0.029*** 0.004 32.16*** 
Net Migration Rate* Church Attendance -0.002 0.002 0.83 
 
*P < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001. Note: For reasons of space economy this table displays 
only the coefficients of the cross-level interactions with their standard errors and Wald-tests 
(1 df) and not the main effects and controls. The cross-level interactions were carried out in 
the fully controlled multilevel model as displayed in Table 3. 
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FIGURE 1. Scatterplot: country percent racially intolerant by country-level religiosity. 
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FIGURE 2. Cross-level interactions: Importance of religion and national contexts.  
 
Note:  The plots show the coefficient of finding religion important with upper and lower 
95% confidence intervals at each point of the scales of the country-level variables. The 
country-level variables have been mean-centered.  
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Online Appendix 
 
Table A1. Model fit of multi-group confirmatory factor analysis (MCFA) across 47 
countries  
 
Model   X2 df Diff. in X2  CFI TLI RMSEA 
One-Factor 
Model 
Ethnic 
Intolerance 
Scalar 
Invariance 11500.258 449 219.974 .931 .958 .131 
Partial 
Scalar 
Invariance a 
 
2065.327 165 P<0.001 .966 .977 .091 
Partial 
Scalar 
Invariance b 
1431.519 161 . .976 .983 .076 
 The factor-model included “would not like: people of a different race,” “would not like: immigrants,” “would 
not like: Jews.” “Would not like Gypsies” and “would not like Christians/Muslims” were included initially, but 
dropped from the model due to measurement non-invariance after inspection of the item-thresholds and model 
modification indices across countries.b Partial scalar invariance when excluding Turkey. 
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Table A2. Imputation report 
  Observations   
Variable Complete Incomplete Imputed Total 
“Would not like as Neighbor: People of a 
different Race” 
64997 2789 2789 67786 
Belief: Personal God 66909 877 877 67786 
Belief: Spirit/Life Force 66909 877 877 67786 
Fundamentalism 66603 1183 1183 67786 
Church Attendance 66960 826 826 67786 
Importance of Religion 66793 993 993 67786 
Sex: female 67774 12 12 67786 
Education: tertiary 67171 615 615 67786 
Education: above primary, below tertiary 67171 615 615 67786 
Right-wing 62533 5253 5253 67786 
Age 67495 291 291 67786 
Note: Thirty multiple imputations were carried out using chained equations in STATA. The imputation model 
accounts for clustering by country. Auxiliary variables: bad health, volunteering. The imputation model 
includes the interaction terms used in the final models. 
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Table A3. Multicollinearity diagnostics 
Variable VIF Tolerance Squared 
Catholic 2.33 0.42 0.5706 
Protestant 1.62 0.61 0.3818 
Orthodox 2.57 0.38 0.6108 
Muslim 2.10 0.47 0.523 
Other Denomination 1.13 0.88 0.1159 
Church Attendance 1.80 0.55 0.4445 
Importance of Religion 2.00 0.50 0.5005 
Belief: Personal God 2.47 0.40 0.5945 
Belief: Spirit/Life Force 1.76 0.60 0.4307 
Fundamentalism 1.31 0.76 0.2361 
Education: tertiary 1.99 0.50 0.4971 
Education: above primary, below tertiary 1.97 0.51 0.4931 
Volunteering 1.09 0.92 0.0806 
Sex: female 1.04 0.96 0.0382 
Long-term Unemployment 1.14 0.88 0.1191 
Age 1.18 0.85 0.1492 
Right-wing  1.02     1.01 0.979 
Country-Mean importance of Religion 2.28 0.44 0.5614 
GDP per capita (log) 4.67 0.21 0.7857 
Gini Coefficient 1.64 0.60 0.3907 
Political Stability 1996-2008, Mean 4.07 0.24 0.7542 
Net migration rate 1.93 0.52 0.4806 
Mean VIF 1.93   
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